INTRODUCTION
A poorly-performing economy, accompanied by Congressional proposals to curb regulation and new research on regulation's effects on employment, have led to increased interest in incorporating employment impacts into regulatory analysis. Both the extent to which such impacts are estimated and the approaches used to estimate them vary greatly, due in part to a lack of consensus on how to best conduct such assessment.
2 As a result, there is a growing need to identify "best practices;" i.e., analytic approaches that are consistent with the welfare economics framework, reflect well-conducted empirical research, and meet the information needs of policymakers and other stakeholders. Such practices are typically identified through careful review of theory, previous analyses, and scholarly research, as well as substantial discussion among experts. This chapter takes an initial step toward identifying these approaches, proposing general principles for further consideration that reflect my views as a regulatory analyst.
regulatory action if it is expected to be "significant" and also to assess regulatory and nonregulatory alternatives if it is expected to be "economically significant." 4 Executive Order 12866 defines both costs and benefits broadly, including adverse effects on employment as one of several impacts to be considered. Executive Order 13563 lists promoting job creation as one of the goals of the U.S. regulatory system. However, until recently, employment effects were primarily considered temporary transitional impacts and received relatively little attention in regulatory analyses.
Given continuing high unemployment rates, Federal agencies are now investigating how to best assess these effects. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) Circular A-4
(OMB 2003) provides general government-wide guidance for regulatory analysis but does not specifically address employment impacts. In its draft 2012 Annual Report to Congress, OMB solicits public comment on whether and how to conduct such analyses, encouraging agencies to assess these impacts while recognizing that such analysis is difficult and complex.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the only Federal agency that has developed more comprehensive guidance, which is not surprising given that it promulgates a substantial proportion of the regulations subject to the executive order analytic requirements.
EPA's 2010 guidelines follow the usual convention of separating assessment of social costs (as part of the benefit-cost analysis) from assessment of their distribution (in an economic impact analysis). Employment effects are primarily discussed as part of the latter, consistent with the standard assumption of full employment. Under this assumption, any unemployment associated with a new regulation is expected to be temporary as workers transition to new jobs and wages adjust as needed. Thus unemployment is currently treated largely as a short-term distributional impact, related to who bears the costs of a regulation as labor shifts across industries and geographic areas, not as a significant determinant of a regulation's net benefits. EPA reserves a yet-to-be completed appendix for discussion of how to address structural unemployment in the benefit-cost analysis.
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In this chapter, I recommend, for further consideration, some general principles that fit into the existing framework for regulatory analysis and could be feasibly implemented more broadly in the near term. I narrowly focus on job creation and job loss (both short-term and longterm), but note that it is important to consider other characteristics of employment (such as effects on wage levels, quality of work, and the number of people seeking work), other microand macroeconomic measures (such as returns to capital, location decisions, incentives for innovation, and overall production), and nonmarket outcomes (such as improved health and environmental quality). I first address related definitions, then discuss nine recommendations.
SOME DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS
Before proceeding, it seems useful to frame the discussion by defining some terms and concepts that are not always used consistently but are important to what follows.
Benefits versus costs:
The distinction between "benefits" and "costs" is somewhat arbitrary, because decreased benefits can be categorized as costs and decreased costs can be categorized as benefits. I use the term "costs" to refer to the reallocation of real resources associated with regulatory compliance, including direct compliance expenditures, any offsetting savings, and resulting impacts on market supply and demand. The value of a real resource is determined by its opportunity cost (its value in its best or most beneficial use), often referred to as its "social" cost. Thus the costs of a regulation are the net opportunity costs of forgone goods and services that result when regulatory compliance reallocates resources away from what would otherwise be produced and consumed.
I use the term "benefits" to refer to the purpose for which such resource reallocation is required -the goals that the regulation is intended to achieve. For regulations subject to the executive order analytic requirements, these goals often include improving human health or safety or environmental quality. In some cases, these outcomes can be valued using market data; in others, nonmarket valuation methods (based on analysis of related market goods or surveys) are needed.
Benefit-cost analysis versus distributional analysis:
The distinction between benefit-cost analysis and distributional analysis is more principled. As traditionally practiced, benefit-cost analysis focuses on determining which policy, if any, would be most economically efficient; i.e., is likely to lead to the largest net benefits on a national level. In contrast, distributional analysis focuses on how costs and benefits are allocated across different subgroups or sectors, including any transfers between groups. While benefit-cost analysis and distributional analysis rely on much of the same information, they differ in how the impacts are disaggregated and reported.
Although both types of analysis provide important and useful information, U.S. 
PROPOSED PRINCIPLES
Below, I propose nine general principles for application to economically-significant regulations subject to the analytic requirements of Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and OMB Circular A-4. These are intended as practical advice that fits within the current framework for regulatory analysis, which can be implemented more broadly in the near-term at a relatively low cost without first conducting substantial new primary research. Given space constraints, I
reference other sources that provide more detailed, technical information. The ability to quantify and value these impacts is currently significantly constrained by the need for more primary research; as the research base evolves, these recommendations should be revisited and refined.
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For the analyses described below to be useful for decisionmaking, the documentation must be transparent: clearly explaining the data, analytic methods, and results, as well as the strengths and limitations of the approach. The analyses must also explore related uncertainties both qualitatively and quantitatively (including the potential impacts of non-quantified effects) and discuss the implications for decisionmaking. 6 Such transparency and recognition of uncertainty is particularly important given the substantial challenges associated with assessing employment impacts.
Address employment impacts when salient, tailoring the analysis to their likely
significance.
The purpose of regulatory analysis is to inform decisionmakers and the general public about the relative merits of alternative interventions (including no action) to promote evidencebased decisionmaking. To be useful, the analysis must provide information that is salient, addressing impacts of concern to decisionmakers and other interested parties. At a time when unemployment rates are high and numerous bills to curb regulation are being considered by Congress, assessing the number of jobs that may be gained or lost seems essential. A finding that employment impacts are likely to be negligible may be just as important as a finding that they may be significantly negative or positive. When unemployment rates are low, these impacts may be smaller and less important to the debate, reducing the need for such analysis.
This analysis need not be extensive. As discussed under Recommendation 2, for many regulations simple screening may suffice. If screening analysis indicates that the regulation is not likely to noticeably affect employment, all that may be needed is a short statement that summarizes the supporting evidence. Where more substantial impacts are expected, the next step will often involve estimating the number of jobs gained or lost and describing their characteristics as part of an EIA. When quantifiable job losses or gains are likely to be 5 significant, analysts should also consider whether and how to value related impacts in the benefit-cost analysis, as discussed under Recommendation 6.
2. Use screening analysis to determine the need for detailed assessment and to guide next steps.
Regulatory analyses are usually conducted under tight time and budget constraints, and require thinking carefully about where best to target analytic resources. Screening analysis is an important tool for guiding these decisions. Such analysis can involve simple comparisons; for example, analysts may compare compliance costs to total production costs to determine whether Review of the literature will aid in this screening as well as support subsequent work, and prior analyses may yield estimates of employment impacts for similar policies that could be adapted to the present context. Agencies should consider developing easily-searchable databases of relevant studies and data sources. They should also develop criteria for determining whether a source is of sufficient quality and suitable for use in a particular regulatory context, analogous to the criteria now recommended for transferring benefit values (e.g., as in EPA 2010).
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For some regulations, the screening analysis will be adequate to conclude that no further work is needed. If more detailed assessment is warranted, then the screening results can be used to identify priorities for further research as well as to determine how to best allocate analytic time and resources. In some cases, better understanding other cost or benefit categories will be 6 7 In developing criteria for quality and applicability, analysts should consider the extent to which market conditions have changed since the data were collected as well as the characteristics of the policy impacts considered. Many previous studies of employment impacts rely on relatively old data and look at relatively major changes (e.g., all
pollution abatement expenditures or all rules promulgated under the Clean Air Act) rather than considering the impact of an individual regulation under market conditions more similar to the present. more important than improving the analysis of employment impacts; in others, further exploring employment impacts will be a high priority.
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The research base is presently insufficient to provide specific indicators or thresholds that could be used to determine the extent to which detailed assessment of employment impacts is desirable. While development of such indicators or thresholds may become possible as the research base evolves, they are likely to vary depending on the nature of the industry and the regulation as well as market conditions. In the interim, analysts should carefully describe the criteria applied in each particular case to determine whether the screening analysis is adequate or whether further assessment is desirable.
Be realistic about baseline employment conditions and associated uncertainties.
Regulatory impacts must be measured in comparison to a baseline that predicts conditions in the absence of the intervention over time. Specifying this baseline can be challenging, in part because most regulations will not be implemented immediately. Regulations are usually first proposed for public comment then revised before final promulgation (which may take several years), and may not become fully effective until long after they are issued. Thus current employment conditions may not be good indicators of likely conditions during the transition period nor at the point when industry fully complies with the requirements.
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Predicting near-and long-term changes in employment levels is notoriously difficult.
When uncertainty in the baseline assumptions is expected to significantly affect the results, analysts should assess the regulatory options in comparison to alternative baselines. Given current economic conditions, at present it may be reasonable to consider one baseline that assumes that the economy will return to full employment by the time the regulation is implemented, and a second that assumes continuing high unemployment.
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In addition, employment conditions in the particular industries or geographic areas most directly affected by the regulation may not reflect conditions in the overall economy. These 8 See Elliott in this volume for discussion of other factors that could be considered in determining the extent to which employment impacts should be assessed.
conditions may influence factors such as the characteristics of affected jobs and individuals, the number of jobs gained or lost, the duration of the transition period, the likelihood that new positions will be filled by individuals who would be otherwise unemployed, and, in the case of job losses, the likelihood that unemployment will be long-term. Such factors will need to be considered in predicting responses to the regulation as well as in describing baseline conditions, since they affect the extent to which any unemployed workers will find it difficult to transition to different jobs as well as the extent to which employers will find it difficult to fill any new jobs created.
Address increases and decreases as well as net changes in employment,
recognizing the complexity of the impacts.
Regulatory compliance can lead to temporary or long-term increases and decreases in employment in the affected industries, in related industries, and in the overall economy. 10 Some observers simply assume that regulation will increase production costs in the affected industries, these costs will be passed onto consumers as increased prices, which will lead to decreases in the quantities demanded, thereby reducing employment. This scenario is flawed, however, because it fails to consider the underlying characteristics of the affected firms and markets as well as the many ways in which they may respond to a regulation (see Morgenstern in this volume). For example, Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih (2002) note that industry and market conditions may limit the extent to which costs are passed onto consumers as well as the extent to which price changes affect demand. In addition, as production costs rise, more labor and other inputs may be required to produce the same output. Compliance activities also may be more or less labor intensive than pre-regulatory production. As discussed in Berman and Bui (2001) , regulation is likely to have a greater impact on employment when it affects labor-intensive industries. Thus regulation may cause employment in the affected industries to increase, decrease, or remain the same. 8 10 These impacts can be estimated using a variety of different approaches, including input-output, partial equilibrium, and computable general equilibrium models. EPA (2010) discusses the strengths and limitations of alternative approaches in various contexts. When employment impacts are addressed in both the distributional analysis and the benefit-cost analysis, differing modeling approaches may at times be appropriate. However, analysts will need to clearly describe the rationale for and the implications of these differences.
When a regulation is expected to lead to both employment gains and losses, analysts should report these increases and decreases as well as the net effect where feasible. Those who may lose their positions may differ in significant respects from those who may gain employment, affecting, for example, their ability to easily transition to new jobs. In addition, reporting only the net result masks the magnitude of the underlying changes: a loss of one job balanced by a two job gain appears the same as a loss of 10,000 jobs counterbalanced by a 10,001 increase.
The likely timing and duration of job gains and losses also should be estimated to the extent possible. Employment impacts may include a short-term component, as firms make the initial investments needed for compliance, and a longer-term component, as they undertake continued operation and maintenance and the market adjusts. In some cases, the "short"-term effects of transition may last for many years. Impacts may also vary over time as the industry becomes accustomed to the requirements and innovates. Because employment in the affected industries may decline or grow for other reasons, analysts will need to carefully consider the interactions between the regulation and other factors that influence employment trends.
Compliance requirements also may indirectly affect employment in related industries.
These may include, for example, those that are the suppliers or customers of the regulated industry, that provide substitutes for or complements to the regulated industries' products, and that produce the goods or services needed for regulatory compliance. The screening analysis discussed under Recommendation 2 can aid agencies in determining the extent to which various impacts can and should be investigated for a particular rulemaking and in describing the rationale for focusing on certain types of effects.
Consider the effects of regulatory benefits on employment.
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Analyses of job losses and gains typically focus on the effects of regulatory compliance costs. Regulatory benefits may also affect employment. 11 In particular, many economicallysignificant regulations lead to substantial health benefits, enhancing productivity by reducing 11 Although benefit valuation can be challenging, ideally the benefit-cost analysis would apply estimates that reflect how those affected value these changes in productivity as well as other attributes. Thus the value of related productivity impacts is presumably already incorporated in the benefit-cost analysis. Recommendation 5 instead addresses whether these benefits might noticeably affect the number of jobs available.
illness-or injury-related absences from work as well as decreased effectiveness while at work, and reducing work-years lost to premature mortality. 12 The extent to which increased productivity will lead to changes in employment is uncertain, however. Rising productivity may increase the income of those affected and their demand for goods and services, promoting overall economic growth and associated increases in employment. Yet improved productivity also decreases the number of workers required to achieve a given level of output. Better health may also lead workers to allocate more time to leisure, reducing hours worked but potentially enhancing their sense of well-being. Further review of the literature is needed to explore how changes in health and longevity contribute to employment.
Any such impacts are likely to be more diffuse than cost-related impacts, and may affect different population subgroups. For example, regulatory benefits may include small reductions in mortality risks throughout a large population, increasing its productivity, while regulatory costs may lead to layoffs at a few individual firms. Thus understanding the distribution of these impacts as well as their potential magnitude is desirable.
Consider the implications of employment gains and losses for benefit-cost analysis.
Incorporating the value of employment gains and losses into regulatory benefit-cost analysis involves four steps: (1) quantifying the number of jobs gained or lost; (2) characterizing the positions and individuals affected; (3) valuing the gains and losses; and (4) assessing related uncertainties. Each of these steps raises a number of complex and difficult issues, full discussion of which would require substantially more space than available here. Below, I primarily focus on valuation, mentioning other issues only briefly. I first introduce the framework for valuation, then discuss labor as a production input, transition costs, involuntary unemployment, and nonpecuniary effects. The screening analysis described under Recommendation 2 can be used to identify regulations with employment-related impacts that should be included in the benefit-cost analysis. If employment gains and losses cannot be reliably quantified (see Recommendation 4), analysts should instead discuss the potential implications qualitatively.
Consistent with the focus of this volume, this discussion largely addresses job gains and losses. However, it is important to recognize that regulation may affect earnings even for individuals who continue to be employed in the same positions. For example, tax interaction effects in the labor market mean that regulatory implementation may depress real wages, regardless of whether identifiable jobs are gained or lost (see Goulder (2000)).
Valuation framework: Welfare economic theory provides the framework for benefit-cost analysis. Within this framework, labor can be assessed from two perspectives. 13 First, it is a resource ("human capital") used along with other resources to produce goods and services. The standard assumption is that workers are paid the value of their marginal product, so that compensation can be used to value productivity. From this perspective, loss of employment may allow skills to deteriorate and decrease human capital, while employment gains may have the opposite effect.
14 Second, labor is a source of individual satisfaction ("utility") largely because it provides income that can be used to buy goods and services. Individuals chose how to allocate their time between full-or part-time market production (paid work), nonmarket production (e.g., household, child-care, and volunteer work), and various leisure pursuits, based on their willingness to trade-off income for the satisfaction they gain from uncompensated activities. A more dynamic view would include the social costs and benefits that accrue over the transition period. The rationale for exclusion appears to be the belief that these costs are likely to be relatively small and difficult to measure. Given constrained time and resources, excluding such costs reflects analysts' need to focus on assessing those impacts that are most important to decisionmakers and other stakeholders. It would be desirable, however, to review the research literature to estimate the potential range of these costs under differing conditions (including characteristics of the regulation and affected industries as well as the overall unemployment rate), so as to determine when transition costs may be significant and provide estimates that could be included more routinely in regulatory analysis.
Involuntary unemployment:
Regulations may led to involuntary unemployment regardless of the overall employment rate due to mismatches between the skills and locations of affected workers. Conversely, workers with highly-demanded skills may find it easy to transition to new employment regardless of overall labor market conditions. However, a high unemployment rate is likely to make these transitions more difficult for many.
The effect of regulation-induced job gains and losses on long-term involuntary unemployment is not currently included in regulatory benefit-cost analyses. To value these effects, analysts would need to first predict the extent to which new jobs are likely to be filled by those who would otherwise be involuntarily unemployed, and the extent to which job losses are likely to lead to long-term involuntary unemployment. They would then need to determine the value of these impacts; i.e., their opportunity costs measured using market data or nonmarket valuation methods to estimate individual willingness to pay for the changes.
Because more theoretical and empirical work on these issues is needed, in the near-term any such assessment should be considered illustrative and reported in a separate section of the benefit-cost analysis, so as to highlight related uncertainties and allow readers to clearly distinguish net benefits with and without these values. Analysts also may find it useful to conduct a breakeven analysis, estimating the amount that employment impacts would need to contribute to the costs or benefits of the regulation to change the relative rankings of the policy options (including no action). Decisionmakers and other interested parties can then review the results to consider whether employment impacts within this range seem possible.
Recent research provides approaches that can be used to value employment impacts in these illustrative analysis. For policies that increase employment, Bartik (2012) proposes an approach that allows analysts to predict the extent that new jobs will be filled by those currently unemployed and to value the effects of this employment. He suggests two measures of value: one based on adjustment of the reservation wage (i.e., the lowest wage at which a worker is indifferent between employment and unemployment), and a second based on adjustment of expected earnings. It appears that both approaches can be feasibly implemented based on available data. Bartik also provides information on associated uncertainties that should be discussed in presenting the analytic results. For policies that decrease employment, analysts could explore inverting the Bartik approach so as to value employment losses rather than gains.
Another option is to apply estimates from research on the effects of unemployment on income, physical and emotional health, and other factors. However, as discussed in Masur and Posner (2012) , most studies focus on mass layoffs, the effects of which may differ significantly from the effects of many regulations. In addition, these studies do not provide a method for estimating whether a particular regulation is likely to lead to short-or long-term involuntary unemployment, or lead to employment of individuals who would otherwise be unemployed.
Analysts should exercise extreme caution in applying these estimates, which may not be appropriate for many regulations.
Non-pecuniary effects:
The values individuals place on employment or unemployment may not be fully reflected in wages or other costs, due to market imperfections and other factors.
Often, the only way to capture these values is to use nonmarket valuation methods. These include revealed preference studies, which estimate the value of nonmarketed goods based on the value of market goods, using statistical methods to control for other factors that affect their value. Alternatively, stated preference studies may be used, that rely on surveys to elicit individual willingness to pay for the outcome of concern. Both methods have been used extensively to estimate the value of time use, including numerous recreation and transportation studies. Many of these studies include information on the value of work time relative to other activities. This literature could be reviewed to provide further insights into the value of regulation-induced employment changes. Adler (in this volume) discusses related issues in more detail.
Place employment impacts in context.
It is very difficult to determine the policy implications of a statement that a regulation will create or eliminate "X" jobs. Regardless of whether employment impacts are addressed solely in a screening analysis, in an EIA, or in a benefit-cost analysis, they need to be placed in Analysts should also provide information on the magnitude of the impacts relative to other measures. For example, a regulation that adversely affects employment may have other benefits that more than compensate, and a regulation that leads to job losses or gains that appear large when expressed as an absolute value may be viewed differently if compared to overall employment levels. Consideration of cumulative effects across regulations may also be useful.
Where job losses or gains appear significant, participants in the decisionmaking process are likely to be interested in more than the number of jobs affected and any related social costs or benefits. To the extent possible, analysts should provide information on job characteristics, including those that may make it particularly easy or difficult to fill new positions or for those who lose their jobs to find other employment. For example, an individual who loses a job in one industry and quickly gains similar employment nearby at the same wage rate will be of less concern than an individual who suffers long-term unemployment or takes a new job at a significantly lower wage. Other characteristics of those affected should also be discussed; in particular, job gains and losses among low income or otherwise disadvantaged groups will be of greater concern than effects on more affluent groups. In addition, wages and the quality of employment matter, and should also be addressed. 15 An analysis that assess the effects of regulation on the overall income distribution, and on economic growth more generally, ultimately may be more informative than an analysis that only considers employment.
Assess the costs and benefits of any policy changes designed to address employment impacts.
If employment impacts are expected to be significant enough that the agency proposes to address them by changing the regulation or by implementing other policies, then the costs and benefits of these additional actions should be assessed as well. In cases where a regulation is expected to lead to job losses, it may be less costly and more effective to mitigate these effects through policies that address unemployment directly (including tax and income support as well as job search and training programs), rather than by adapting a regulation that focuses on reducing environment, health, or safety risks or other goals. Similarly, policies that directly focus on job creation are likely to be a more efficient approach to increasing employment than changing regulations designed primarily to achieve other goals.
Include employment impacts in plans for retrospective analysis.
Under Executive Orders 13563 and 13610 (Obama 2011 (Obama , 2012 , agencies are required to conduct retrospective review of their regulations, including both their individual and cumulative impacts. These reviews are focused primarily on identifying opportunities for regulatory reform.
However, retrospective analysis also can provide important insights for ex ante assessment, as illustrated by the research now used to inform analysis of employment impacts, which was conducted from an ex post perspective. 16 Additional retrospective assessment that addresses more recent regulatory impacts could contribute substantially to the development of improved analytic practices.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In sum, I propose nine general principles for further consideration: 1) Address employment impacts when salient, tailoring the analysis to their likely significance.
2) Use screening analysis to determine the need for detailed assessment and to guide next steps.
3) Be realistic about baseline conditions and associated uncertainties.
4) Address increases and decreases as well as net changes in employment, recognizing the complexity of the impacts.
5) Consider the effects of regulatory benefits on employment.
6) Consider the implications of employment gains and losses for benefit-cost analysis.
7) Place employment impacts in context. 8) Assess the costs and benefits of any policy changes designed to address employment impacts.
9) Include employment impacts in plans for retrospective analysis.
All analyses require making some simplifying assumptions due to gaps in the available data and research and limitations in the available modeling tools, as well as time and resource constraints. Many of these assumptions affect all aspects of the analysis, not solely the estimates of employment impacts. However, assessing employment impacts is particularly difficult due to the complexity of the effects and the need for more primary research. At minimum, analysts should disclose the assumptions used and discuss their implications. Quantitative sensitivity analysis or probabilistic uncertainty analysis (e.g., using Monte Carlo models) is useful where possible to supplement more qualitative discussion.
